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RACE-CONSCIOUS CHILD PLACEMENT: DEVIATING




In the world of child placement, racial classifications are wide-
spread. While outright prohibition of transracial placement will not
pass constitutional muster,' the use of race as a factor in determining
the best interest of the child is frequent, endorsed, and sometimes
even mandated by adoption agencies, statutes, and courts.2 Where
equal protection issues have been raised, race-matching preferences
have survived strict scrutiny in this nation's courts.3
Curiously, such matching policies have persisted in a legal system
which is in nearly every other case offended by racial classifications
that burden or stigmatize a particular group.4 Because such race-
based classifications are inherently suspect and subject to strict consti-
tutional scrutiny, race-conscious state action is rarely tolerated.5 In
* Third-year law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am grateful to Professor
Katherine K. Baker for her encouragement and invaluable comments and suggestions during the
development of this Note.
1. See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (striking down under strict
scrutiny a Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial adoption); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967) (striking down a Texas statute which prohibited the adoption of a white child by
an African American or the adoption of an African-American child by a white as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause).
2. See infra notes 10-79 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). The statute at issue in In re
R.M.G. required that the petition for adoption state the race of the involved parties. Id. at 783
n.6.
4. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1873). See also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.8 (1986).
5. See infra notes 80-116 and accompanying text. Race-conscious action is sometimes tol-
erated where it prevents future discrimination or remedies specific acts of past discrimination, as
in the context of affirmative action. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (up-
holding a congressionally imposed plan which gave preference to minority applicants for broad-
casting licenses so as to achieve broadcast diversity). But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down under strict scrutiny a minority set-aside program). For
a further discussion of affirmative action with regard to race-matching policies in adoption, see
Elizabeth Bartholet, Where do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adop-
tion, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1228-38 (1991).
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fact, excluding the context of affirmative action, only one racial classi-
fication has ever survived in the United States Supreme Court.
6
This distinctive realm of child placement, where prospective par-
ents and available children are separated and classified on the basis of
race, thus stands as an exception to the general rule that no racial
classification is absolutely necessary to further any state interest, how-
ever compelling. 7 Those with decision-making power in placement
disputes have labeled the "best interest of the child" as the compelling
state prerogative for purposes of a strict scrutiny analysis.8 They also
maintain that the consideration of race is a necessary means of ad-
vancing this interest. 9 It is suggested that a child's welfare is best
served by same-race parents, who can better instill a sense of racial
integrity in the child.
This Note will examine current matching policies and judicial
standards for child placement. It will then suggest that although
same-race parenting would likely be optimal from a social and psycho-
logical standpoint, the consideration of race in a child placement pro-
ceeding is highly suspect from both a legal and practical standpoint.
The best interest of the child is a compelling objective; however, con-
sideration of race is neither a necessary nor narrowly tailored means
of achieving this goal. Furthermore, consideration of race is often det-
rimental to a child's well-being as it frequently results in long term
foster care. Thus, despite the theoretical appeal of race-matching, the
practice of race-matching often is at odds with the child's best interest.
Moreover, plainly stating that race may be a "factor" in a place-
ment proceeding is an extremely vague instruction. The unbridled
scope of this instruction facilitates stigmatization by allowing race to
become the decisive factor in placement proceedings. Because race,
when used as a criterion in child placement, leads to discriminatory
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the compelling interest in
prevention of espionage and sabotage required the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry
from war areas). See also infra notes 80-116 and accompanying text.
7. The Supreme Court first articulated the "strict scrutiny" test in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
216.
8. There is clearly state action with regard to adoption and child custody where a state
statute prescribes or public agency practices race-matching or preferencing. In the case of pri-
vate agencies, however, Elizabeth Bartholet suggests that where a private agency functions in
areas that have traditionally been the realm of states and public agencies, such as creating an
adoptive family, its actions could be considered state action. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1229
n.187.
9. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
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application and perpetuation of racial prejudice, it should never enter
the deliberations.
I. RACE AND CHILD PLACEMENT
A. Race-Matching Policies and Preservation of Culture in
Adoptions
Because adoption agencies regard racial and cultural heritage to
be part of a child's identity, such heritage is usually honored in the
search for permanent families. 10 Although private agencies put less
emphasis on race,11 most agencies prefer "timely placements of chil-
dren in same-race families where feasible within the law."' 12 Agencies
will typically characterize this policy as a mere preference for same-
race placement in their mailings and literature. In effect, however, the
stated policies are more powerful than mere preference. Indeed,
there appears to be a hidden agenda to avoid placing children trans-
racially whenever possible.'
3
Whatever the actual practice, public agencies almost always de-
clare the ability to preserve a child's racial, ethnic, and cultural heri-
tage as one issue to be considered when determining what placement
will be in the best interest of the child. 14 This policy raises two con-
10. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK COMM., JUNIOR LEAGUE OF CHICAGO, ADOPTION: A GUIDE
To ADOPTION IN ILLINOIS 20 (1988) [hereinafter ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK]. See also NATIONAL
ADOPTION EXCH., NATIONAL ADOPTION CTR., QUESTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT
ADOPTION. Interestingly, different placement standards apply with regard to race in the context
of foster care. Perhaps due to the inherently temporary nature of foster care, there is considera-
bly less hesitation on the part of agencies to place an African-American child in the care of white
foster parents. See id. For an expansive view of agency policies, see Bartholet, supra note 5, at
1183-1200.
11. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1184. One agency reported that approximately 60% of
the African-American children it places are placed interracially. The other 40% are placed with
African-American families. Telephone Interview with Julie Tye & Linda Hageman, Directors of
The Cradle Society (Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Tye & Hageman Interview]. Judith Bailey, direc-
tor of The Adoption Center in Massachusetts, another private agency, stated, "If a couple wants
a white baby, I think they should get it. Even if it's a black couple. I don't force the issue....
[I]n my experience of adoption, racism is an issue." John Robinson, Judith Bailey's Circle of
Love, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1992, at 53, 61.
12. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 20; accord Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1183.
13. These unwritten rules were detailed through a series of interviews conducted by Eliza-
beth Bartholet. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1183-88. See also Infants, ADOPTION UPDATE
(National Adoption Ctr., Phila. Pa.) at 1. (stating that most children are indeed placed with same
race families). Even though the overwhelming majority of white couples seeking to adopt a
child are in search of a white infant, transracial adoption does occur. One estimate indicates that
private agencies place 50% of their minority children transracially, however, the statistics may
vary. Joe Kroll, Media Sensationalizes Trans-racial Adoption Issues, ADOPTALK SAMPLER
(North American Council on Adoptable Children), 1993, at 7.
14. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 26. The Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services, for example, lists the following factors:
1994]
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cerns. First, it promotes a belief that the inherently nonnatural con-
cept of adoption can be made "natural" simply by matching the skin
color of the prospective parents and adoptees. Physical similarities,
however, do not transform an adoptive family into a biological one.'5
Over emphasis on physical similarities only reflects a policy which
overlooks deeper notions of the meaning of family. It de-emphasizes
the emotional bonding and support which should be the true measure
of the success of a newly formed adoptive family.
Second, considering the ability of a family to preserve a child's
racial heritage is problematic because of its overbearing effect on
other factors involved in a placement decision. Most people would
concede that an African-American family is inherently better
equipped to preserve an African-American child's heritage. 16 If, as
race-matching policies implicitly assume, preservation of an African-
American child's heritage is better for the child's emotional well-be-
ing, then the African-American parents may also be automatically
more capable of meeting (at least some of) the "emotional needs of
the child," another factor which is often considered by agencies before
1) the wishes of the child who demonstrates the maturity and cognitive ability to par-
ticipate in the decision;
2) the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child;
3) the child's need for stability and continuity of relationship with parent figures;
4) the interaction between the child and the prospective adoptive parent;
5) the prospective adoptive parent's ability to meet the physical, mental, and emotional
needs of the child; and
6) the ability of the prospective adoptive family to provide an environment which
would preserve the child's racial, ethnic, and cultural heritage.
Id. Factors identified elsewhere may include: "moral fitness of the two parties"; the age, sex,
and health of the child; and the potential family environment. See D. Michael Reilly, Constitu-
tional Law: Race as a Factor in Interracial Adoptions, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022, 1022 n.1 (1983).
15. The current trend in Britain is to reject the ideal of race-matching and support a "more
practical and less ideological approach to adoption." Veronique Mistiaen, Britain Prepares Laws
to Liberalize Adoption, CHI. TR1a., Jan. 2, 1994, § 6, at 1. New adoption laws in Britain seek to
prohibit social workers from blocking transracial adoptions. While acknowledging that ethnic
background is important, officials state that what is most important is the parents' capacity to
support the child through life's challenges. Id. British Health Secretary, Virginia Bottomley,
stated that "[tihere should be no place for ideology in adoption. We want common sense judg-
ments, not stereotyping." Id.
American courts have rejected the notion that a child should live with a parent whom he or
she more closely resembles. See, e.g., Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534-45 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1956) (reversing the district court's decision to leave the children with their African-Amer-
ican father, which was based solely on the children's and father's similar racial characteristics).
Though Fountaine involved a custody dispute between an interracial couple, the same sentiments
should apply generally to adoptive mixed race families. But see Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978) (stating that the "duplication of a child's biological environment" is an ideal goal for
an adoption agency).
16. See Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 ("[i]t is a natural thing for children to be raised by
parents of their same ethnic background.").
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placement. 17 However, the ability to meet the emotional needs of the
child may involve more than just preserving and fostering the child's
racial heritage.
Although a direct link between the matching policies and the
longer periods of time minority children remain in foster care has not
been conclusively established, the connection seems to exist logically.
For example, it is well established that there are markedly fewer Afri-
can-American families waiting to adopt.18 By the same token, a
healthy African-American infant will wait for placement approxi-
mately five times longer than a healthy white infant. 19 A "majority of
African-American children remain [ ]in [foster] care for well over two
years," and one third of these children remain for five or more years.20
Sadly, the longer a child remains in foster care, the less likely it be-
comes that the child will ever be adopted.2' Such data is consistent
with the theory that race-matching delays placement of waiting minor-
ity children. If there are fewer African-American families waiting to
adopt, and transracial placement is precluded, there are simply no
homes available to care for the waiting African-American children.
Moreover, the presumption that an African-American family can
best preserve an African-American child's heritage or culture begs the
question of whether a child is even born with a culture. Culture is a
societal phenomenon. 22 From the standpoint of an infant or toddler
waiting to be adopted, it is not clear whether or not she has a culture
to preserve, much less whether preserving it is actually in her best
interest when the alternatives are considered.23 The threat of loss of
17. See ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 26.
18. See infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.
19. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS & INSPECTION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MINORITY ADOP-
TIONS 7-8 (1988) [hereinafter MINORITY ADOPTIONS]. In addition, while a ten year old white
child with emotional problems will average ten months in foster care, a ten year old African-
American child with the same problems will remain approximately twenty months in foster care.
Id.
20. MARTY JONES, NATIONAL ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, ADOPTION & THE AFRI-
CAN-AMERICAN CHILD: A GUIDE FOR AGENCIES 3.
21. Id.
22. Perhaps the goal should be a broader "American culture," which de-emphasizes separa-
tion and instead encourages education of white America by other ethnicities. Indeed, what
"American culture" means and what it comprises has become increasingly unclear to some
scholars. As one writer has noted:
Each year, this country becomes less white, less "European," and less tightly bound by
a single language. The United States now has a greater variety of cultures than at any
time in its history.... In addition, some Americans who were born in the United States
are saying they can no longer identify with its prevailing culture.
Andrew Hacker, Trans-National America, N.Y. TIMES, November 22, 1990, at 19.
23. See JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. PoussAinrr, BLACK CHILD CARE: How To BRING UP
A HEALTHY BLACK CHILD IN AMERICA (1975). Comer and Poussaint argue:
19941
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culture or heritage, then, may not be to the child individually, but
rather to the race as a whole. At best, the threatened loss affects the
individual child only to the extent that the child is a member of the
race in peril. However, the individualized best interest of the child
standard is not necessarily an appropriate vehicle for securing the col-
lective well-being of a group.
2 4
Furthermore, a "best interest of the child" standard that involves
race-matching requirements may ultimately be an ineffective means of
preserving African-American culture. As we have seen, insistence on
preservation of "culture," as a practical matter, means same-race
placement. The end result is often long term foster care or complete
preclusion of adoption. If children are consigned to foster care or in-
stitutions, they will be at a disadvantage and will have fewer resources
to contribute to the future development of their ethnic culture. In the
most immediate future, these children need families, not culture.
B. Statutory Race-Matching and Preferencing Policies
1. Mandated Racial Matching
Courts have not tolerated statutes which mandate race-matching
and explicitly prohibit transracial child placement. 25 In In re
Gomez,26 the district court, relying on a Texas statute which prohib-
ited transracial adoption, denied an African-American man's petition
to adopt his white wife's two white daughters.2 7 After acknowledging
that any statute which openly classifies people according to their race
should be subject to strict scrutiny, the appellate court, without even a
close analysis of the statute, was "impelled to the inevitable conclu-
sion" that the statute was unconstitutional.28
Although infants become aware of color and feature differences, these things have no
meaning to them. Unless they are taught in a very direct and specific way, they have
little or no interest in the question of skin color or racial variations until around three
years of age. Race is a complicated concept which they learn over time. It does not
help to try to explain the idea of race to the infant.
Id. at 25.
24. The Supreme Court has expressed its disapproval of using an individual to further a
group interest: "Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to
suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic
groups." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1977).
25. See, e.g., In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Compos v. McKeithen, 341
F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
26. Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656.
27. Id. at 657. The Texas statute prohibited both the adoption of African-American chil-
dren by whites, and also of white children by African Americans. Id.
28. Id. at 659.
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Five years later, a similar Louisiana statute was invalidated in
Compos v. McKeithen.29 Compos was a class action brought for a de-
claratory judgment to determine the validity of the Louisiana stat-
ute.30 The court rejected the defendant's argument that adoptive
parents and children should have similar physical characteristics so
that adoptees might obtain a so-called "normal" home environment. 31
Analyzing the statute under strict scrutiny, the Compos court refused
to defer blindly to the "wisdom of state legislatures" in cases involving
racial classifications. 32
Reasoning that any possible disadvantages of different race place-
ment did not outweigh the benefits of having a home, the Compos
court held that the statute did not promote the best interests of chil-
dren in all cases.33 In fact, the court explained that the interest being
promoted was not the best interest of the child; rather, it was the "in-
tegrity of race in the adoptive family relationship. ' 34 Finally, the
Compos court acknowledged that there would be inherent difficulties
in an interracial home in Louisiana, however, these challenges only
justified consideration of race "as a relevant factor" in a placement
proceeding, not as the decisive one.35
2. Statutory Preferences for Same-Race Placement
While outright bans on transracial placement have been struck
down, several state statutes (and most public placement agencies)
continue to advocate a preference for same-race placement. For ex-
ample, Minnesota's adoption law clearly articulates that "[t]he policy
of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of the
child are met by requiring due, not sole, consideration of the child's
race or ethnic heritage .... ,,36 Moreover, the statute provides that a
29. Compos, 341 F. Supp. 264.
30. Plaintiffs Guillermo and Carolie Compos were a Caucasian couple whose request to
adopt an African-American child was denied by several agencies on the basis of the Louisiana
statute. Id. at 265. Plaintiff Edmond Norman, an African-American man, and his wife Gerda, a
white woman, were told by several different Louisiana agencies that they were not eligible to be
adoptive parents because they were an interracial couple. Id.
31. Id. at 266.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 267. The court recognized that life in a transracial home was better than life in an
institution. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 266.
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West Supp. 1994). Interestingly, the words "not sole"
were inserted into the statute in a 1993 amendment. Before the amendment, the statute read:
"The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of the child are met by
requiring due consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage..... MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 259.255 (West 1992) (emphasis added).
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
court "shall give preference" first to relatives of the child, then to fam-
ilies of the same-race, and lastly to families of another race.3 7 Several
states have similar statutes.38
A similar policy is currently pending on the federal level. A bill
has been proposed in the United States Senate which would mandate
a preference for racial matching, while providing that the adoption of
a minority child must not be unduly delayed for purposes of locating
same-race parents. 39 The goals of the Multiethnic Placement Act are
"to decrease the length of time that children wait to be adopted" and
"to prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. 40
Preference legislation may indeed be a sincere effort to benefit
children and guard against societal prejudice. However, by authoriz-
ing even minimal delay and reflecting favoritism for race-matching,
preference legislation is tantamount to a ban on transracial placement.
It sends a signal to agencies that racial matching is better and leaves
the system wide open to abuse. Moreover, it mandates racial separa-
tism and codifies the prejudice lingering in American society. In real-
ity, the federal bill, if passed, would do little to change current policies
because it fails to take a firm stand on the issue of transracial place-
37. The current statute reads as follows:
The authorized child placing agency shall give preference, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to placing the child with (a) a relative or relatives of the child, or,
if that would be detrimental to the child or a relative is not available, (b) a family with
the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or, if that is not feasible, (c) a family of
different racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowledgeable and apprecia-
tive of the child's racial or ethnic heritage.
If the child's genetic parent or parents explicitly request that the preference de-
scribed in clause (a) or clauses (a) and (b) not be followed, the authorized child placing
agency shall honor that request consistent with the best interests of the child.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West Supp. 1994).
38. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993) ("In all custodial placements.., due
consideration shall be given to the child's minority race or minority ethnic heritage."); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-311 (1993) (consent to adoption may not be withheld "for the sole
reason that the race or religion of the prospective adoptive parents is different from that of the
individual to be adopted ...where to do so would be contrary to the best interests of the
child.").
39. Charisse Jones, Role of Race in Adoptions: Old Debate Is Being Reborn, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1993, at 1, 13. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, an Ohio
Democrat, articulated an emerging belief in this country: "I'm so outraged at the fact that any-
one would give priority to any issue over the welfare of a child." Id. Implicit in this statement is
that same race placement does not always further the best interest or "welfare" of the child,
where the alternative is life in an institution or foster care. See also Randall Kennedy, Kids Need
Parents - Of Any Race, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1993, at A14.
40. Kennedy, supra note 39, at A14. The bill would deprive agencies blocking transracial
adoptions of federal adoption funds. Jones, supra note 39, at 13.
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ment.41 It merely reiterates the preferences already at work in many
states.
3. Race as a "Factor"
Consideration of race as one factor among many in measuring the
best interests of a child has proven to be the general rule among
courts with regard to placement decisions. Where racial classifications
are intermingied with a weaith of other factors, the discrimination
may not be as obvious as it would be in the case of an outright ban on
transracial adoption. Nevertheless, the "race as a factor" system
leaves itself wide open to judicial and administrative abuse.
The weight allocated to race by courts in a child placement pro-
ceeding varies depending on the nature of the case. In cases involving
a custody dispute between same-race natural parents, where one par-
ent has subsequently become involved with a member of another race,
little significance is accorded to race.42 Similarly, reviewing courts
have allowed race to play only a small role in custody disputes be-
tween natural parents of different races. 43 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, there are cases involving white foster parents seeking to adopt
an African-American or biracial child. These foster parents battle
41. The senate bill has aroused apprehension in the National Association of Black Social
Workers. See Jones, supra note 39, at 13. This is not surprising in light of the stand the organiza-
tion has taken with regard to transracial placement in the past:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for
adoption. Black children belong, physically, psychologically, and culturally in Black
families in order that they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound
projection of their future. Human beings are products of their environment and de-
velop their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within their family structures.
Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves
as Black people.
Our position is based on:
1. the necessity of self-determination from birth to death, of all Black people.
2. the need of our young ones to begin at birth to identify with all Black people in a
Black community.
3. the philosophy that we need our own to build a strong nation.
We ... have committed ourselves to go back to our communities and work to end
this particular form of genocide.
National Association of Black Social Workers, Position Paper Developed from Workshops Con-
cerning Transracial Adoptions (April 1972), reprinted in RITA JAMES SIMON & HOWARD ALT-
STEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOFrION 50-52 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); In re Marriage of Kramer, 297 N.W.2d
359 (Iowa 1980); Edel v. Edel, 293 N.W.2d 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Lucas v. Kreischer, 299
A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973). A few courts have given race slightly more weight in the context of subse-
quent interracial relationships on the part of one spouse. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d
212 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Langin v. Langin, 276 N.E.2d 822 (11. Ct. App. 1971); Tucker v. Tucker,
542 P.2d 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
43. See, e.g., Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532 (Il1. Ct. App. 1956); Beazley v. Davis,
545 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1976); Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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either against agencies who aim to place the child with African-Amer-
ican adoptive families, or against members of the child's biological
family." Race has been pivotal to the decisions in these cases.
a. Custody
Where divorced, same-race parents dispute custody because one
parent has become romantically involved with a member of a different
race, courts have noted that the parent's newly found interracial asso-
ciation is irrelevant. 45 Courts have further agreed that the possibility
of racial tension and community prejudice arising from the custodial
parent's interracial relationship is not presumptively relevant to tradi-
tional guidelines for custody adjudication.
46
Courts have also rejected as a justification for denial of custody
the possible threat to a child's racial integrity said to arise from the
interracial relationship of a parent. In Myers v. Myers,47 a white fa-
ther sought custody of his children because he feared that the racial
identity of the children would be threatened by their mother's subse-
quent relationship with an African-American man. The Pennsylvania
court found the race of the mother's companion irrelevant to the chil-
dren's developing sense of identity and refused to alter the custody
arrangement. 4
8
The Supreme Court has spoken with regard to these types of cus-
tody disputes. In Palmore v. Sidoti,49 the petitioner sought custody of
his three year old daughter one year after his divorce from the child's
mother. Both parents were white. The petitioner sought custody of
the child based on "changed conditions," namely, that the child's
mother was then living with an African-American man.50 The lower
44. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Gloria
G. v. State Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 833 P.2d 979 (Kan. 1992); Child v. Stangler,
No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318 (W.D. Mo. 1992); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs., 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983).
45. See Edel, 293 N.W.2d at 796 (precluding lower court, on remand, from considering the
race of the mother's boyfriend).
46. See Kramer, 297 N.W.2d at 361 ("We emphatically reject the idea that parent child
relationships are to be dictated by unsubstantiated judicial predictions concerning the effects of
racial prejudice in the community. Community prejudice, even when shown to exist, cannot be
permitted to control the makeup of families."); Lucas, 299 A.2d at 245 (holding that subsequent
interracial remarriage in and of itself was not compelling reason to deny custody to natural
mother).
47. Myers v. Myers, 360 A.2d 587 (Pa. 1976).
48. Id. at 591-92.




court awarded custody to the father, noting that if the child were
raised in an interracial home, she would face needless societal pres-
sure and stigmatization. 51 In applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the lower court, and concluded that
taking the child away from her natural mother to protect her from the
possible harm that societal prejudice might someday inflict was consti-
tutionally impermissible.
52
Significantly, the Palmore Court acknowledged that the best i-
terest of the child was an "indisputably" compelling state objective,
and noted the special role of the state in protecting the welfare of
young children. 53 However, the Court did not engage in a best inter-
ests analysis; that is, there was no conclusion that it would be in the
best interest of the child to remain with her mother in the racially
mixed home. Rather, the Court explained that although the threat of
societal pressure was real, racial prejudice can be neither authorized
nor effectuated by law. 54 The structure of the Court's analysis implies
a belief that it may indeed put a child's welfare in jeopardy to live with
parents of different races. In fact, it seems that if racially motivated
considerations were not forbidden, the Court might have removed the
child from the mixed home.
Where the custody dispute involves natural parents of different
races, custody will not be awarded on the basis that the child possesses
physical characteristics which are more similar to those of one par-
ent.55 Courts have emphatically rejected the notion that children of
interracial marriages will be better adjusted if they live with the parent
whom they more closely resemble.56 In Fountaine v. Fountaine,57 the
appellate court reversed an award of custody to an African-American
father which was based on the similarity of the children's and the fa-
ther's "racial characteristics." The appellate court noted that even
51. Id. at 431. The lower court explained, "[T]his Court feels that despite the strides that
have been made in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that
Melanie will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come." Id.
52. Id. at 434. Although the Court used the term "substantial," the rest of the equal protec-
tion analysis indicates that it actually assumed the interest was "compelling." Id. at 433.
53. Id.
54. Id. ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect."). See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White,
J., dissenting) (Decision-makers must never avoid constitutional questions by deferring to the
"hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply
held.").
55. See Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956).
56. See Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950).
57. Fountaine, 133.N.E.2d 532 (Il1. App. Ct. 1956).
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though the trial judge "went to great lengths to ascertain how the wel-
fare of the children might best be served," he abused his discretion by
making race his decisive consideration.
58
Similarly, in Beazley v. Davis,59 the Nevada Supreme Court
found that the lower court had abused its discretion when it granted
custody of children of an interracial marriage to their African-Ameri-
can father simply because their physical characteristics were more Af-
rican American than white. Analyzing the decision under strict
scrutiny, the court expressed that the mother was prejudiced by the
lower court's consideration of racial physical characteristics. 6°
In these two types of cases, it is relatively clear why courts will
not consider race as an important factor when determining custody.
First, the presence of the natural parents reduces the difficulty of the
decisions. In general, family law consistently favors protection of the
biological, or "formal" family, a bias which has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court.61 Therefore, there is a presumption that a child's best
interests are served if she is raised by a natural parent.
Second, in a society which allows intermarriage, it would be illog-
ical to deprive a natural mother the right to her child simply because
she became involved with an African-American man subsequent to
her divorce from a white man. She could, lawfully, marry an African-
American man62 and later have children with him. To deprive her of
the right to raise her own white child in whatever race home she
desires is inconsistent where mixed race homes are otherwise "author-
ized" by law. The inconsistency could only be explained as a manifes-
tation of notions of racial purity and social prejudice. It would be
equally illogical to deny either parent of an interracial marriage cus-
tody on the basis of race, because the child would have grown up in a
mixed race home in the absence of the divorce. To consider race in
these custody disputes would simply be a method of taking subtle ac-
58. Id. at 534-35.
59. Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207 (Nev. 1976).
60. Id. at 207-08.
61. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("No one disputes the appropri-
ateness of Illinois' concern with the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution
of our society."); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) ("[A]s part of their general over-
arching concern for serving the best interests of children, state laws almost universally express an
appropriate preference for the formal family."). See also Alsdurf v. Alsdurf, 133 N.W.2d 479,
482 (Minn. 1965) ("The law in this state is well settled that it is in the best interests of a child to
be brought up by the mother unless she is wholly unequal to such responsibility.").
62. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down an antimiscegenation statute on
equal protection and due process grounds).
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tion against interracial marriage. 63 Courts would effectively discour-
age interracial relationships by denying parties to such relationships
the same rights to their children as same-race families would receive
in the event of separation.
In light of the presence of the natural parents as well as society's
acceptance of intermarriage, race plays a relatively minor role in cus-
tody disputes. As will be seen, however, race plays an integral role in
foster care and adoptive placement.
b. Foster Care and Adoptive Placement
Cases dealing with foster care and adoptive placement can be di-
vided into two categories. First, there are cases in which white adop-
tive parents compete with a member or members of the child's
biological family for adoption of the child.64 Second, there are cases
in which white adoptive parents compete either with an agency which
intends to place the child with some unidentified same-race family in
the future, or with an African-American adoptive family.65 These
cases usually involve foster care. It is in this context that the "race as
a factor" standard is most clearly exposed as tantamount to an out-
right ban on transracial placement.
Courts will sometimes avoid the constitutional issue altogether
where there is a member of the child's biological family petitioning to
adopt. In In re D.L., the Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to
address the constitutionality of a statute which took race into consid-
eration, stating that placement of a child with a family member is pre-
sumptively in the best interest of the child.66 Arguably, cases in which
63. See In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 789 (D.C. 1982).
64. See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 603 (1992);
R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776.
65. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O'Hare, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F.
Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Gloria G. v. State Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 833 P.2d 979
(Kan. 1992); Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318 (W.D. Mo. 1992); In re
Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth
Servs., 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983).
66. D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375. Although the trial court also stated that placement with the
natural family was most advantageous to the child, there was evidence presented on appeal that
the judge may have been biased against the white foster parents. Apparently, the judge pub-
lished the following statement in a local newspaper:
[Tihe vast majority of white Minnesotans unthinkingly accept white culture as the
norm-indeed, as the whole of reality. To such radical ethnocentrics, people of color
are forever too weak (they "can't" act white, i.e. "normal") or too scary (they won't act
white). Whites who want not to be racist expend huge effort trying to be clear and fair
in their understanding of people of color, so as to help colored people transform them-
selves into a reasonable facsimile of white people. What we really must do is see that
we, in our unexamined whiteness, are the problem. We should use our energy better,
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a member of the natural family is involved should be grouped with
custody cases, as it is presumptively less "offensive" to award custody
to a biological family over an adoptive one.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that
where the goal of a foster care plan is ultimate reunification with a
natural parent, race may be considered in determining the best inter-
est of a child.67 In J.H.H. v. O'Hara, white foster parents claimed that
the Missouri Division of Family Services violated their right to equal
protection where two African-American foster children were perma-
nently removed from the foster home because of race.68 Although the
intention of the agency when it initially removed the children from the
plaintiff's home was to continue foster care elsewhere, the plan was
modified to pursue eventual reunification with the natural father.
69
The court refused to interpret Palmore as prohibiting the considera-
tion of race in all placement proceedings.
70
In In re R. M. G. & E. M. G.,71 both the white foster parents of an
African-American child and the child's African-American paternal
grandparents petitioned for adoption. The trial court determined that
both families exhibited great love and affection toward the child, and
that all other factors were relatively equal. Noting, however, that "se-
vere questions of identity" would probably arise from a transracial
placement, the trial court awarded custody to the African-American
paternal grandparents. 72 Because the trial court did not adequately
articulate its analysis with regard to the comparative weight of all the
factors, the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals in In re R.M.G. directly acknowledged the
dangers of discriminatory application of the statute where no real lim-
its or directions were placed on a trial judge's consideration of race.
73
This risk prompted the court to establish a specific system, comprised
use it to understand how we have constructed an America that vests unearned power
and privilege in whites.
Id. at 378, (quoting STAR TRIB., June 21, 1990, at 21A).
67. J.H.H., 878 F.2d 240.
68. Id. at 240. Interestingly, the defendants presented evidence which aroused suspicion
that the plaintiffs foster parents, who had been licensed foster parents for almost twenty years,
had physically abused two other foster children in the past. Id. The substantiated risk of child
abuse would seem to be in and of itself a reason to deny a foster family custody of children in the
future.
69. Id. at 242.
70. Id. at 245.
71. In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
72. Id. at 782.
73. Id. at 790 ("We would be naive simply to ignore [the possibility of discriminatory appli-
cation] based on the commonly shared hope that times have changed.").
[Vol. 69:1121
RACE-CONSCIOUS CHILD PLACEMENT
of three inquiries, through which race should be considered: (i) "how
each family's race is likely to affect the child's development of a sense
of identity, including racial identity"; (ii) "how the families compare in
this regard"; and (iii) "how significant the racial differences between
the families are when all the factors relevant to adoption are consid-
ered together. '74 This narrow construction of the race-matching pro-
vision was intended to guard against abuse of discretion.
The Ccurt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apparent!y di'd ct dis-
play the same concern over possible discriminatory application of the
"race as a factor" system. In Drummond v. Fulton County Depart-
ment of Family and Children Services,75 the court denied a white
couple's petition to adopt a biracial child to whom they had been fos-
ter parents for almost a year, and authorized removal of the child
from the home. While the care provided by the Drummonds had
been deemed excellent by the placement agency, the agency deter-
mined that it would be in the child's best interests if a permanent
home was sought elsewhere. The Drummonds argued in part that
they were denied equal protection because race played too great a
role in the agency's decision.
76
Relying on Compos, the court found that race could be consid-
ered as a relevant factor as long as it was not the decisive one. The
court insisted that consideration of race "suggests no racial slur or
stigma in connection with any race."'77 Moreover, the court felt that
consideration of race precludes the "potentially tragic possibility" of
placement with parents who will be unable to "cope with the child's
problems. 78 When "duplication of [a child's] natural biological envi-
ronment" is the ideal goal of an adoption agency, consideration of
race is not constitutionally forbidden.
79
74. Id. at 791.
75. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1203
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
76. The Drummonds raised a due process argument in addition to their equal protection
claim. They asserted two possible liberty interests: (1) their relationship with Timmy as "psycho-
logical parents," and (2) their interest in a reputation free from the stigma which would result if
their petition were denied. Id. at 1206. The court rejected each of these interests. It found that
the temporary nature of foster care, coupled with the fact that the foster relationship is state-
created, rendered whatever interests might exist in the foster relationship, limited. Id. at 1206-
07.
Timmy's liberty interest in a stable environment was also considered by the court, and
although such rights were implicitly acknowledged, the court dismissed them. Id. at 1208.
77. Id. at 1205.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1205-06.
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND RACIAL MATCHING POLICIES
The unconstitutionality of considering race in child placement is
especially striking when considered in light of basic principles of equal
protection and constitutional law. The equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."80 The
clause, however, does not preclude all classifications of people in any
statute or policy. In fact, most statutory classifications will be upheld
unless they are completely arbitrary; classifications need only be ra-
tionally related to some legitimate or important government inter-
est.81 However, where a classification is drawn on the basis of race, it
is considered "inherently suspect" and must succumb to a higher level
of judicial scrutiny.
8 2
Classifications based on race, then, must be necessary to further
compelling governmental objectives.8 3 The only case in which a racial
classification survived this strict scrutiny is Korematsu v. United
States,s4 where the Supreme Court found that exclusion of Japanese
Americans from certain areas of the West Coast was a necessary
means for the military to further its interest in national security.
85
Korematsu, however, is criticized among commentators as an appal-
ling betrayal of constitutional rights which one could attempt to ex-
plain only on the very narrow grounds of wartime necessity. 86 Indeed,
subsequent decisions cite Korematsu primarily, if ever, for the narrow
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. Equal protection may be invoked where there is state
mandated discrimination. The actions of judges working in their official capacity will constitute
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
81. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911); ROTUNDA, supra note
4, at 400. The "mere rationality" standard is not a high hurdle. Courts will show great deference
to the legislature where the classification is not drawn along racial lines. See Daniel v. Family
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (holding that the state goal of eliminating funeral insur-
ance was legitimate); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a
statute which banned purchasing or selling of advertising space on rental vehicles in general, but
allowing business vehicles to advertise their own business).
82. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
83. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
84. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
85. Id. at 223. The Court acknowledged that "[clompulsory exclusion of large groups of
citizens from their homes... is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions." Id. at 219-
20. However, the Court insisted that "[t]o cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue." Id. at
223.
86. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreward: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1985); Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the




principle that racial classifications are inherently suspect and subject
to the strictest judicial scrutiny.
87
Several landmark decisions concerning racial classifications have
arisen in the family law area. In fact, two in particular effectively sup-
port interracial family relationships. In Loving v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court held that a Virginia antimiscegenation statute violated
the equal protection clause. 88 The Court found that there was "pa-
tently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious ra-
cial discrimination" that could justify the statute.89 The Court further
labeled the law as a measure "designed to maintain White
Supremacy." 90 The Loving Court implicitly recognized that the mix-
ing of races was inevitable in modern society and any attempt to
thwart this natural consequence of integration could only be viewed as
prejudicial and bigoted. Similarly, in McLaughlin v. Florida,91 the
Court struck down a Florida statute which prohibited interracial co-
habitation. Using strict scrutiny,92 the Court ruled that the state's pur-
ported interest in preventing promiscuity was not advanced by the
racial classification. 93
Affirmative action is the only major context other than child
placement in which racial classifications have been upheld by courts.
However, even a racial classification which serves to remedy the ef-
fects of past discrimination toward a particular group is regarded as
highly suspect and must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny.94
Cases that deal with such benign classifications require that the reme-
dial program be narrowly tailored to address the specific discrimina-
tion it intends to remedy. Moreover, an affirmative action program
may not be designed to remedy general past societal discrimination. 95
87. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
88. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The lower court in Loving referred to an earlier Virginia deci-
sion, Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), as setting forth the purpose of the legislature in
enacting the miscegenation laws. The court in Naim listed the state's purposes: (i) preservation
of "the racial integrity of its citizens"; (ii) prevention of "the corruption of blood"; (iii) "a mon-
grel breed of citizens"; and (iv) "the obliteration of racial pride." Id. at 756.
89. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
90. Id. Justices Stewart and Douglas noted in their concurrence in McLaughlin v. Florida
that they could not "conceive of a valid legislative purpose ... which makes the color of a
person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense." 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964)
(Stewart, J. and Douglas, J., concurring).
91. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184.
92. The Court stated that this type of law "bears a heavy burden of justification .... Id. at
196.
93. Id.
94. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-96 (1989).
95. Id. at 498-99.
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Some of the most highly publicized affirmative action plans arose
as attempts to remedy discriminatory policies in employment 96 and in
education.97 To illustrate, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
the Jackson, Michigan school system amended its lay off policy to af-
ford protection to recently hired minority teachers at the expense of
nonminority teachers with seniority.98 The school board's traditional
lay off policy was based on seniority; thus, when it came time for lay
offs, that policy would have basically eviscerated the more recent hir-
ing of the minority teachers.99
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court struck down the new
lay off plan because it found that none of the interests proffered by
the board-responding to societal discrimination, the need for Afri-
can-American role models for African-American students, and prior
discrimination by the board itself-were sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the racial classification. 00 Moreover, even if any of these interests
were compelling, the Court felt that the lay off plan was not narrowly
tailored to address these interests.'
0 '
Similarly, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,' °2 the
Supreme Court faced an affirmative action plan which, in essence,
sought to reserve sixteen seats in each entering medical school class
for disadvantaged minority students. 10 3 White applicants, in effect,
could not compete for these sixteen places.' 0 4 In a fragmented opin-
ion, the Court held that the quota system in force at the University
96. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding racially proportional
promotion scheme for state trooper positions); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding hiring goal of 29% minority membership in union that
had been previously found guilty of intentional discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
97. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
98. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. The amended lay off provision stated, in relevant part:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through layoff
from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be
retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel
laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the
layoff.... Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions
for which he is certificated maintaining the above minority balance.
Id. at 270-71.
99. Id. at 270 n.1.
100. Id. at 274-78.
101. Id. at 283.
102. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
103. The University's admission program included a separate admission system for minority
students, which operated with a special admission committee comprised mostly of minority
members. Applications would go before the special committee if applicants noted their mem-
bership in a minority group on their applications. Id.
104. Id. at 289.
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violated the equal protection clause. 10 5 Justice Powell supported the
University's asserted interest in the plan-the need for an ethnically
diverse student body. °6 However, he felt that the quota system was
not necessary, and therefore not permissible.
07
There are several reasons why race-matching and race-preferenc-
ing policies of child placement cannot reasonably be characterized as
remedial programs instituted to benefit African Americans as a group.
First, it is clear from the affirmative action cases that the remedy must
be specific to the discrimination it intends to counter. The most im-
mediate difficulty, then, lies in defining the requisite level of specific-
ity. For example, it may be argued that race-matching policies exist to
remedy prior cases of transracial placement. 08 This is problematic
because the effect of preferencing policies has been to keep transracial
placement to a minimum.
It is easier, however, to find past discrimination if that discrimina-
tion is more broadly defined. Even when transracial placement does
take place, it has been noted that discrimination still occurs because
the transracial placement is typically of an African-American child
into a white family and rarely, if ever, vice-versa.'0 9 It is the African-
American children who have been taken away from their culture. 110
Moreover, and more generally, transracial placement can be viewed as
one part of a long historical pattern of discrimination against African
Americans. As one scholar has noted, "[a] vast array of social poli-
cies going back to the institution of slavery can be characterized as
responsible for the fact that it is African-American families whose
children are disproportionately available for adoption and white fami-
lies who are disproportionately in a position to seek adoption." ''
However, this level of generality has not been endorsed as sufficient
justification for an affirmative action program. 1 2
In addition, transracial placement viewed on a practical level is
not discriminatory in the sense that it is not necessarily hurtful, as was,
for example, the original failure of the school board to hire minority
teachers in Wygant. Preferencing policies generally preclude trans-
105. Id. at 319-20.
106. Id. at 311-12.
107. Id. at 320.
108. Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1231-32.
109. Id. at 1184. It has been reported that only 1.2% of all adoptions were between a white
mother and an African-American child. Id. at 1184 n.53.
110. Id. at 1232.
111. Id.
112. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986).
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racial placement unless no matching families are found. Therefore, at
least as far as public agencies are concerned, a transracial placement is
an absolute last resort, and the best alternative for a hard to place
child. As will be seen, the number of waiting children so greatly out-
weighs the number of African-American families waiting to adopt that
the alternatives to transracial placement can only be long term foster
care or institutionalization."13 When a transracial placement occurs,
then, it is deemed as a benefit to the child, in light of the alternative of
long term foster care, and not a hurtful act with prejudicial
undertones.
Furthermore, a goal of traditional affirmative action programs
has generally been to promote integration, as it is generally believed
that "the nature of the racial problem.., lies in the segregation of an
oppressed class. ... 114 Yet, the very essence of race-matching poli-
cies involves validating and perpetuating racial separation. Such poli-
cies, then, appear to be "backward-looking" rather than
progressive."15
Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the widespread racial matching
that occurs in the context of child placement with basic principles of
constitutional law. An analysis of these matching policies under strict
scrutiny further reveals their unconstitutionality.
III. RACE MATCHING AND RACE As A FACTOR SHOULD NOT
WITHSTAND STRICT SCRUTINY
A. The Compelling Interest
Courts have assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that the best
interest of the child is the overriding compelling governmental objec-
tive in the equal protection sense. 16 That is, a child's welfare is of
such magnanimous importance that it may justify even a racial classifi-
cation. On the other hand, courts have agreed that a state's interest in
protecting a child from societal prejudice is not a compelling interest
for equal protection purposes. Unfortunately, in the context of race
and child placement, a child's best interests and protection of a child
from societal prejudice become highly intertwined. In fact, it may be
113. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
114. Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1233.
115. Id. at 1233.
116. See In re R.M.G. & E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. 1982).
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impossible to separate a child's welfare (a compelling interest) from
the effects that society has on that child (a non-compelling interest)."
7
When courts consider race as a factor in determining the best in-
terest of a child, of primary concern is the effect that a transracial
placement will have on the child's sense of identity. As it is generally
accepted that identity and self esteem are developed in childhood,
concerns over the effect of a transracial placement on a child are logi-
ca!.118 An interracia~ly placed child, it is argued, w;l! be confused, un-
able to relate to either African-American or white communities.
Consequently, an African-American child living in a white family will
be ill-equipped to deal with the reality of racism in society.1 9 Related
to identity issues and of equal concern is the child's racial integrity,
which includes the child's awareness of her own heritage and preser-
vation of her biological culture. It is said that a child with a secure
sense of self when she enters the world will be better prepared to con-
front inevitable racial tension.' 20 If a child lives with different race
parents, she will be unsure of herself and where she belongs.
As powerful as the state's interest in insuring the child's personal
welfare may be, it is not clear that this is the interest actually being
furthered. Rather, courts and adoption agencies seem to be further-
ing the less legitimate, underlying interest of protecting children from
societal prejudice in the future. One court, in describing the impact of
race on a child's identity, cited several disadvantages to transracial
placement.12 1 Notably, all of these disadvantages were external, that
is, they derived from societal biases and not from personal identity
struggles. The court expressed concern that the adoptive grandpar-
ents and other new relatives would reject the child; that friends and
neighbors would treat the child differently; and that the child would
face greater pressure from peers in adolescence.
2 2
117. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. La. 1972).
118. See generally, COMER & POUSSAINT, supra note 23.
119. See Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interest Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 110 (1991).
120. See, e.g., R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776. The court in R.M.G. included the existence of "survival
skills" in its definition of identity. Id. at 787. See also Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth
Servs., 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983).
121. See Davis, 465 A.2d at 623.
122. The court stated that
[a] child of one race living in an environment consisting totally or predominantly of
another race may face an imposing array of problems. The nonimmediate relatives
(grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins) of the adopting or foster parents may reject the
child. Friends and neighbors may harbor racial animosity or be awkward in their deal-
ings with the child, which may be manifested in insults and physical abuse. The child
may have few role models. A predominantly different race environment tends to take
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It is difficult, then, to separate the compelling goal of preserving
racial identity from the less compelling goal of guarding against socie-
tal prejudice. In fact, the concern for preserving racial identity almost
certainly derives from a history of racism whose effects are deeply en-
graved into the community. It is this history of racism that makes the
African-American fears of annihilation or loss of identity plausible.
Concern about African-American identity, therefore, gives credence
to the social prejudice. In fact, the conflation of the two propounded
interests-one legitimate and one not-and the difficulty of defining
them, raises serious questions as to whether either of the articulated
interests can ever be served.
B. Consideration of Race in Child Placement Is Not Necessary
Assuming, arguendo, that the best interest of the child is the com-
pelling governmental interest being served, in order to pass constitu-
tional analysis, race-matching classifications must be necessary to
further the government interest at stake. Several points suggest that
race-matching is not absolutely necessary, and, indeed, may be harm-
ful. First, many studies indicate that transracial placements have been
successful and beneficial for all parties involved. Second, the number
of international adoptions, which are almost always transracial, is
skyrocketing. Finally, in light of the number of waiting minority chil-
dren, the alternatives to transracial placement, and the scarcity of mi-
nority families waiting to adopt, it seems that considering race in
placement decisions actually thwarts the legitimate governmental in-
terest in child welfare.
1. Success of Transracial Placement
Expert opinion regarding the success of transracial placement
suggests that most of the transracial adoptions which have occurred
have been positive experiences for families, 123 agencies and chil-
on greater significance as the child approaches and reaches dating age, that trying time
of youth when peer pressure can be so relentless and intense. Although the adopting/
foster family may not object to transracial dating and marriage, friends, neighbors and
relatives may well express disapproval.
Id. at 623.
123. See RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: A FOLLOW-UP
114 (1981). Parents of transracially adopted children have reported that "their adoption exper-
iences had brought happiness, commitment, and fulfillment to their lives .... The majority of
the parents still feel ... that their decisions to adopt transracially were among the wisest and
most satisfying they had ever made." Id.
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dren. 124 As one organization professed, "thousands of children once
considered unadoptable are living and growing up in loving perma-
nent families .... ."25 Studies indicate that transracial adoptees have
fared well in their mixed families. Although data varies, 126 statistical
evidence indicates that interracial adoptees are well-adjusted and
have self-esteem comparable to other adoptees.1 27 Findings have also
been positive with regard to the transracial adoptee's sense of belong-
ing in her new family and community.128
124. Expert testimony, however, may not be of great assistance in an adversarial setting.
Where opposing sides introduce expert psychiatric testimony, it may be easier to understand why
judges have difficulty resolving the issue of race and a child's mental welfare. For example, in
Farmer v. Farmer, the court was faced with a custody dispute between an African-American
father and a white mother over their biracial child. Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981). Five experts were introduced, specialists in the areas of psychology, social work,
and psychiatry. Those appearing on behalf of the defendant professed that the child would be
better off with an African-American parent, not only because society would view her as African
American, but because "her ability to cope with identity problems will depend upon the support
she gets from parents and from her own experience as she matures. In this respect ... a black
identification will serve her best." Id. at 587.
Experts for the plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that while race may be important, it is
not controlling. Most important is the "child's perspective of itself received from the nurturing
parent." Id. Other key factors include love and affection toward the child, stability of the home
and of the parents themselves, and general parenting ability. Id. The child's best interest, it was
explained, is defined by her need for the "concern and interest" of the parent, and the parent's
"maturity." Id.
Given the seemingly conflicting viewpoints, it is not surprising that courts are hard-pressed
to come to any sort of consistent, reasoned decision. However, it may be argued that while
expert predictions and recommendations are helpful, they are not as persuasive as empirical
data. Therefore, the empirical studies may be more useful, and indeed more accurate predic-
tions of the success of transracial placement, and thus a better place for judges to turn.
125. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 8.
126. Simon and Altstein stated that although most of the families studied reported favorably,
some families experienced special difficulties: "For every five families in which there are the
usual pleasures and joys along with sibling rivalries, school-related problems, and difficulties in
communication between parent and child, there is one family whose difficulties are more
profound and are believed by the parents to be directly related to the transracial adoption."
SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 123, at 113. The problem most often noted by parents was a
tendency on the part of the adoptee to steal from family members. Id.
127. See RUTH G. McRoy & Louis A. ZURCHER, JR., TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL
ADOPTEEs: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS 118-19 (1983). McRoy and Zurcher found that the total
self-esteem "score" of transracially and inracially adopted adolescents were nearly identical.
Moreover, the mean "score" for the study's "norming sample"-white, non-adopted adoles-
cents-was approximately the same as that of the transracially placed African-American chil-
dren. Id. at 118-19. The researchers noted that although the transracial adoptees experienced
special social difficulties, "they were able to develop coping skills and adjustment mechanisms
that worked, which yielded normative self-concepts and self-esteem." Id. at 122. See also
Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1211-16.
128. See generally RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND
THEIR FAMILIES (1987). Simon and Altstein point out the strong commitment between the
adoptees and their families based on fifteen years of observation of the families:
For the children, even during these sensitive, complicated years of adolescence, their
adoptive parents are the only family they have and the only set of parents they want.
Some of the family relationships have been rocky, accusative, and angry-and some
remain so-yet they are a family and they are fully committed to one another.
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In fact, empirical evidence supports the argument that transracial
adoptees possess a strong sense of their biological identity. 129 More-
over, transracial adoptees are said to emerge into adulthood with
healthy attitudes toward relationships between races, and are more
willing to live racially integrated lives.130 Transracial adoptees, having
been socialized in two cultures, may be better equipped to function in
a multi-racial, multi-ethnic society.
2. International Adoption
The increasing number of international adoptions provides addi-
tional compelling evidence that race need not play a part in a child
placement decision. In 1992, there were approximately 6,531 interna-
tional adoptions by U.S. citizens. Of this number, half were Asian
children.131 In the 1970s and 1980s, most foreign children came to the
United States from South Korea. 32 Many foreign born adoptees also
come from Latin America, India and the Philippines. 133 Although the
countries from which children are available vary depending on current
world events, 34 in recent years a large portion of foreign born chil-
Id. at 140.
129. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 123, at 16. A study conducted in 1981 indicated that
45% of white parents thought that their biracial or African-American child identified himself as
African American. Id. The same study indicated that 64% of the parents surveyed were reluc-
tant to speculate on whether their child would seek out a same-race spouse. Id. at 17. The
researchers noted that this type of response indicates that these parents are reluctant to come to
grips with these issues. Id.
130. Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1218-21.
131. Elizabeth Mehren, Innocents from Abroad; Prospective Parents Eager to Adopt Children
from Other Countries Often Find Themselves in a Chaotic Shadowy World. A New Effort Sees to
Simplify That, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1993. In Illinois, international adoptions (mainly of children
from Korea, Asia and South America) increased by 600% between 1980 and 1988. ADOPrION
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 27-28. In 1991, 9,008 foreign born children were adopted in the
United States. Children from Romania were the largest group, followed by children from Korea,
Peru, Columbia, India, the Philippines, Guatemala, Chile, Honduras, Brazil, and Paraguay. NA-
TIONAL ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOP TION 1 (Oct. 1991).
132. Bruce Porter, I Met My Daughter at the Wuhan Foundling Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1993, § 6, at 24. There are approximately 10,000 Korean adoptees in Minnesota. The num-
bers have decreased to some degree, however, and the Korean government may end foreign
adoption by 1995. The Koreans' emphasis on bloodlines and ancestry may account for the large
number of United States' adoptions which have occurred. Peg Meier, Minnesota's 10,000 Ko-
rean Adoptees; History, Connections Led to State Having Second Most in Nation, STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 19, 1993, at 7E.
133. Infants, supra note 13.
134. For example, after World War II, United States' military personnel stationed abroad
adopted thousands of children whose parents were killed or somehow missing as a result of the
war. Richard Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J. 317, 325 (1988). Simi-
larly, Americans stationed in Korea during the conflict there, driven by the tragic circumstance
of war orphans, adopted them in huge numbers. Id. at 328. The tragic situation even prompted
Congress to introduce emergency legislation, modifying the immigration quotas so as to accom-
modate the growing numbers of children being adopted by American citizens. Id. International
[Vol. 69:1121
RACE-CONSCIOUS CHILD PLACEMENT
dren adopted by United States citizens have come from China.1 35 In-
ternational adoption, then, is nearly always interracial.
The success of international adoption 136 suggests that we do not
accept the idea that racial identity is critical. It is taken for granted
that the adoption will be transracial. Consideration of the race of pro-
spective parents is secondary, and is neither an obstacle to, nor a con-
sideration in, placement. Agencies do not typically search for same-
race families. Race is merely regarded as an issue about which the
adoptive parents must be educated. For example, Illinois agencies will
typically provide, among their other services, an adoption "prepara-
tion" program for parenting a child of a different race or culture.
137
Parents who adopt internationally are encouraged to exhibit the "cer-
tain sensitivity" necessary to raise a child of a different race. 38
adoption, then, is often justified on the grounds that the children are usually in crisis. They are
children with no future in their birth country, and their alternative to intercountry adoption is
often institutionalization. See INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS COMM. FOR CHILDREN, REPORT ON
FOREIGN ADOPTION (1993) (hereinafter REPORT ON FOREIGN ADOPTION].
135. See Porter, supra note 132. Interestingly, the high premium placed by the Chinese on
boys means that the majority of adoptable Chinese infants are girls. Id. In 1988, only 12 Chinese
children were adopted by Americans. However, this number has increased dramatically. Be-
tween September 1991 and October 1992, approximately 20 Chinese infants were adopted by
United States' citizens per month, and between October 1992 and November 1992, the number
increased to 57. Id.
China modified its adoption laws in late 1991 by erasing the requirement that one adoptive
parent be Chinese or have significant Chinese connections. Id. Beijing has, however, temporar-
ily halted foreign adoptions while the rules are reviewed and revised. Susan Caughman & Lau-
rie Heineman, Chinese Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, § 6, at 8.
136. See e.g., Meier, supra note 132, at 7E. The increasing success of the Korean adoptees in
Minnesota is attributed in part to the fact that "families and agencies were better prepared for
cultural differences." Id.
137. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 29.
138. REPORT ON FOREIGN ADOPTION, supra note 134, at 19. The prospective parents of
international adoptees are encouraged to consider the following questions:
1. What are your ideas about race? What characteristics do you think Asian, Indian,
Latin American, etc., people have? Do you expect your child to have these characteris-
tics? The children become Americanized; therefore try to visualize that cute little baby
growing up into a child, a teenager, an adult, a parent. Think about grandchildren.
2. How do you feel about getting lots of public attention, stares, etc.? Possibly your
adopted child will get too much attention and other children will tend to feel left out.
3. You will become an interracial family. Do you raise your child to have the same
identity as you or your other children? How do you help him develop his own identity?
Should his name reflect his national origin? What relationship will the name have to
the sense of "Who am I"? Imagine a child you know and love being sent overseas to be
adopted. How would you want him raised? As an American in a foreign country? A
native in that country?
4. How can you learn to know what it's like being nonwhite and growing up in a white
society if you don't know this from your own experience? You will have to find out
how to reach or educate yourself to become sensitive to your child's world.
5. Your family will now be interracial for generations. Adoption of a child of another
race or country is not just a question of an appealing little baby. How do you feel about
interracial marriage? How does your family feel about interracial marriage? How do
you feel when people assume that you are married to an Asian person?
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3. Consideration of Race as Harmful: The Waiting Children
A child without a family is a child deprived of the most funda-
mental human right. A child has a birthright to grow up in an at-
mosphere of love and family concern. A child has no birthright to
protein-deficient diets, to forks or chopsticks, to a belly full of para-
sites, to a childhood free of caresses and parental encouragement.
A child has no birthright to a particular shape of house nor to
speaking a particular language. A child has a birthright to parental
love. Can an orphanage ever meet the needs of any abandoned
child? Should we not try to meet the needs of a greater majority of
homeless children by increasing the number of intercountry adop-
tions? Nationality and citizenship mean nothing to a child who is
subnormal, or dead, from the deprivation of institutionalization.
139
Although this statement was made to encourage international
adoptions, its message may apply within the national transracial adop-
tion context as well. The sheer numbers of minority children waiting
in foster or agency care may themselves compel invalidation of both
racial matching policies and consideration of race as a factor in any
placement proceeding. In the adoption context, "waiting children" in-
clude, by most agency figures, African-American children of all ages,
among them healthy infants and toddlers.14° The National Adoption
Center has a register of 1,500 children. Of those 1,500 children, 67%
6. In addition to your qualities and abilities as parents, it is important for you to under-
stand your motivation for this kind of adoption. Do you feel you are doing a good deed
for a poor, homeless child, who will perhaps be more grateful to you when he is older
than if he were your birth child? This is poor motivation and not very realistic. If your
primary orientation is to help the child become absorbed into your culture at the ex-
pense of his own, then transracial adoption is not for you. You must have an attitude of
respect for the country and culture of the child.
7. Do you have the capacity to identify with this child, to see the world from his point
of view and to lovingly supply his physical, mental, and spiritual needs? Do you want
to learn more about the child's culture and heritage? If you do, then you can consider
further the idea of intercountry adoption.
HOLT INT'L CHILDREN'S SERVS., NATIONAL ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION, app. 3 (1991).
139. Rosemary Taylor, International Concerns Comm. for Children, Comment: Transracial
Adoption, REPORT ON FOREIGN ADOPTION, (1993).
140. ADOPTION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 10, at 8, 11. Other waiting children include school
age children between the ages of 9 and 14; sibling groups; children with developmental, emo-
tional, or physical difficulties; and white and Hispanic children over the age of eleven. Id. This
publication contains a listing of children available in different Illinois agencies, and categorizes
them into two groups - "readily placeable" and "waiting children." Id. at 34-102. "Readily
placeable" means white children under the age of five, and "waiting children" means all other
available children. Id. at 34.
Joe Kroll, the Executive Director of the North American Council on Adoptable Children,
notes that waiting children are African American, Native American, Hispanic or of mixed racial
background "waiting for same-race parents." Letter from Joe Kroll, Executive Director of the




are biracial or African-American. 141 In New York City alone, as of
June 1993, 75% of the waiting children were African-American. 42
Healthy white infants and toddlers, on the other hand, are extremely
hard to come by, especially through public agencies. 143
The number of minority children waiting for permanent families
is so much greater than the number of white, healthy waiting children
that many agencies, rather reluctantly, have categorized minority chil-
dren as "special needs" children. 1 " According to several agencies and
adoption groups, a special needs child can be variously dubbed "hard
to place," 145 "waiting,"'146 or "a child for whom we have fewer
families."1
47
While the number of African-American children waiting for
homes is growing, the number of African-American families seeking
to adopt is not growing. The disparity between the numbers of white
families seeking to adopt and the number of African-American
families seeking to adopt strongly suggests that racial matching
policies will inevitably lead to longer periods of foster care, and there-
fore run counter to the best interests of the child. Some hypothe-
size that better efforts to recruit minority families for minority
children could reduce the need for transracial adoptions.148
141. JONES, supra note 20, at 2. The American Public Welfare Association, however, re-
ported that as of June 1993, only about 40% of the nations waiting children were African Ameri-
can. Jones, supra note 39, at 1.
142. Jones, supra note 39, at 1.
143. See Ken Watson, The History and Future of Adoption, Keynote Address Before the
17th Annual NACAC Conference in Ottawa, Ontario (Aug. 8, 1992), in ADOPTALK SAMPLER
(North American Council on Adoptable Children), 1993, at 3. Mr. Watson further stated that
getting a white child can depend heavily on the financial situation or societal power of the adop-
tive parents. Id.
144. See ADOPTION WORKS ... FOR EVERYONE: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO ADOPTION 5
("Although most adoption groups do not believe ethnicity alone should result in a child being
considered to have a special need, federal and state regulations consider ethnicity within that
category.").
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 12.
147. Tye & Hageman Interview, supra note 11.
148. See Kroll, supra note 13, at 7 ("[W]e will ... continue to advocate for an examination of
the dynamics that keep qualified families from serving as foster or adoptive parents to children
of their race."). Another criticism of the adoption system is that it is "culturally insensitive."
Jones, supra note 39, at 13.
Minority families often feel that adoption is something meant only for white, wealthy fami-
lies. Though certain agency policies are not aimed to exclude minorities, they often have a dis-
parate impact on minorities due to socio-economic hardships. Examples of such policies include
the charging of fees, preferences for couples, inadequate explanation of federal subsidy pro-
grams, requirement of medical exams of the entire applying family, sufficiency of living space,
and agency staff attitudes of insensitivity. Moreover, four out of eleven agencies surveyed by the
Office of Human Development Services noted that they did not accept applications from AFDC
recipients. MINORrrY ADOPTIONS, supra note 19, at 10.
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However, significant efforts have been and are currently being
made.1
49
Efforts to recruit minority families may include publicizing in mi-
nority newspapers, featuring individual children in the media, adop-
tion fairs and special events, and sending staff members to recruit at
minority organizations, especially churches. 150 Agencies also will
make efforts to see minority applicants more quickly than white appli-
cants, and will make efforts to have more minorities on their staff. In
fact, most public agencies have specifically trained their staff in "mi-
nority adoption methods" or "cultural sensitivity.' 15 1
In addition, there are several federal programs designed to find
homes for African-American children, presumably with African-
American families. 152 The Adoption Opportunities Program153 pro-
vides grants to states and non-profit groups for training programs and
creating services to break down barriers to adoption and to help find
permanent homes for waiting children. 54 In addition, the Adoption
149. Despite such efforts, the number of African-American families actually recruited is dis-
couragingly small. One agency stated that of the fifty families currently in the "approval stage"
of the adoption process, two were African American. Tye & Hageman Interview, supra note 11.
150. MINORrrY ADOPTIONS, supra note 19, at 3-4. Other special efforts include formal "in-
teragency coordinating mechanisms," including the Black Family Registry in Detroit, The Regis-
try lists all African-American applicants on a central registry for use by all agencies. Id. at 13.
Interagency committees such as KINSHIP share information about waiting children and fami-
lies. Id.
151. Agencies are encouraged to educate their social workers to understand and be sensitive
to the traditions and attitudes of African Americans. "Cultural sensitivity training" includes
"interpersonal communication, including eye contact, voice level, stance, and body space. All
facets of the culture under study should be explored, including its fashion, music, visual arts,
drama, literature, food, and celebrations." JONES, supra note 20, at 5.
Apparently, this type of training is necessary. The Office of Human Development Services
studied minority recruitment efforts in five major metropolitan cities. Researchers met with
agency administrators, foster care and adoption workers, minority applicants and adoptive fami-
lies, representatives of community organizations, and officials of state agencies. Of all the mi-
nority applicants surveyed, 89% were satisfied with the last agency they went to, but 76%
reported complaints about the other agencies they approached. These families reported feeling
uncomfortable, and 18% of the families were so dissatisfied that they nearly gave up. MINORITY
ADOPTIONS, supra note 19, at 4-5.
152. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON ADOPTION, AMERICA'S WAITING CHILDREN: A RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON ADOPTION 26-30 (1988)
(hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Task Force on Adoption advised the President that
greater efforts should be made to recruit black families. As far as transracial placement, the
Task Force recommended a policy that although transracial placement should be permitted, it is
preferable to place a child with a family of his own racial background. A "policy for transracial
adoptions should stand along side an active minority recruitment policy." Id. at 30. Clearly, the
Task Force believes that same race placement is better than interracial placement.
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5111-5115 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
154. For example, grants were used to create the "One Church/One Child" programs, which
are community efforts to find homes for black children. Other similar organizations are "Homes




Assistance Program 55 provides federal reimbursement to agencies of
50% of administrative costs, 75% of training costs, and not less than
50% of maintenance payments made for eligible children in foster
care. 1
56
Despite these efforts, the number of minority children waiting to
be adopted continues to grow. Precluding or discouraging transracial
placement will only prolong their wait.
C. Race as a Factor is Not Narrowly Tailored to Advance a State
Interest in Child Welfare
Even if one assumes that consideration of race may be an impor-
tant tool in determining the best interest of a child, a racial classifica-
tion is "necessary" to serve a compelling state interest only when it is
narrowly or precisely tailored to achieve this purpose. 157 The general
rule that race may be considered as a factor in a placement proceeding
is a tremendously vague instruction. Courts already have extremely
broad discretion with respect to determining the best interest of the
child. 158 Inserting another unstructured rule into these already discre-
tionary deliberations only exacerbates the difficulties faced by judges
in making a best interests determination and lends itself to abuse of
discretion.159
155. 42 U.S.C. §673 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
156. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 152, at 26.
157. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
158. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835
n.36 (1977); In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992).
159. Judges have questioned their own ability to decide what is in a child's best interest. One
judge explained that setting standards for adoption proceedings "involves policy choices which
go to the heart of the welfare of the child, probably for the rest of the child's life.... Are we, as
Federal Judges, endowed with sufficient prescience to decide such delicate issues?" Drummond
v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (Brown,
J., concurring); cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). See also Perry, supra note 119, at 57. Professor
Perry argues for a more structured consideration of race because the highly discretionary best
interest rule facilitates decisions based on "personal biases, unsupported assumptions, and in-
complete analyses." Id.
By the same token, it is difficult for a judge to determine whether an agency abused its
discretion in its consideration of race. For example, the dissent in Drummond described the
difficulty of knowing whether race had indeed been the deciding factor without a detailed and
in-depth hearing:
The complaint alleged that the action of the defendants in removing Timmy from cus-
tody of the Drummonds was motivated solely on racial grounds, that it was done pursu-
ant to a policy that black or part black children could not be placed for adoption with a
white couple. One of the great defects in the proceeding here is the fact it is utterly
impossible to determine whether or not this allegation is true.... [T]here is no indica-
tion that any word about other reasons than [sic] Timmy's race went into any decision-
making or was the basis for the final decision.
Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1219 (Tuttle, J. and Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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As previously discussed, the factor of race in determining the best
interest of the child is ill-defined. In some cases it has meant nothing
more than a consideration of what the opposing parties look like.
160
At other times, "race as a factor" has included the prospective par-
ents' attitudes about race, and their potential ability to provide the
child with the racial "education" thought to be necessary during the
child's formative years.
161
Narrowing the definition and scope of the race factor in order to
narrowly tailor race-matching is theoretically appealing, but practi-
cally ineffective. First, as already suggested, it is unclear what race
and culture mean to an infant, particularly one whose parentage might
include different ethnicities.
Second, considering race as a factor allows courts to latch onto a
very tangible factor (race) in an otherwise very intangible and discre-
tionary best interest of the child analysis. Race is simply too powerful
an influence to be relegated to the status of a mere factor among
many. 162 A judge can physically see the race of the prospective par-
ents and adoptees. A judge cannot physically see the emotional com-
mitment a family might feel for a child, nor can she predict with one
hundred percent accuracy the "fitness" of particular parents. Whether
particular parents will indeed preserve the heritage of an African-
American child is impossible for a judge to predict. The temptation to
assume that an African-American family would be in a better position
to do so is highly apparent. Race is a concrete, unchanging factor.
163
It would be relatively easy, therefore, for a judge, consciously or not,
to rely on the race of prospective parents in making the difficult
determination.
160. See, e.g., Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 532-33 (I11 Ct. App. 1956). See also
Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) ("These unfortunate girls, through no fault of
their own, are the victims of a mixed marriage and a broken home. They will have a much better
opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own
people.").
161. DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
162. Drummond serves to illustrate the influence of race on a placement decision. In Drum-
mond, the foster parents' liberty interest in "reputation" was deemed not to have been damaged
by removal of the child, for "the sole finding about the Drummonds is that in the judgment of
the agency, they are not the best available parents for Timmy, at least in part for a reason be-
yond their control, i.e., their race. Their treatment of Timmy as foster parents was spoken of in
glowing terms." Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1207.
163. Because a prospective parent's wealth might fall into consideration where the inquiry
addresses the parent's ability to give the child a proper home, health care, or nutrition, it might
be argued that wealth, too, is a tangible factor that risks abuse by a judge. However, not only is
"wealth" a changing, somewhat unpredictable factor, but some degree of economic stability is




Third, courts already clearly believe that an African-American
child will fare better with African-American parents and, to the extent
this belief is appropriate, it can be incorporated when the court looks
to whether the emotional and psychological needs of the child will be
met. Courts should not be permitted to use race as a means of escap-
ing the difficult task of evaluating what will be best, in each individual
instance, for a child's growth and personal prosperity.
Because race will necessarily outweigh all other factors in a best
interest of the child analysis, its presence in the placement process
amounts to a preservation, whether intentional or not, of racial preju-
dice.' 64 To perpetuate distinctions between people by allowing race to
come into play in child placement is counterintuitive in that it only
serves to accentuate these differences.
IV. COLORBLIND PLACEMENT
The inherent difficulties in applying a racial classification compel
a conclusion that race should never be considered by an administra-
tive body in any placement proceeding, including the initial adoptive
placement setting. The prospective parents should be the only parties
allowed to consider race in their adoption choices. An adoptive fam-
ily should be permitted to adopt whatever race child it wants, and ad-
ministrative agencies should not interfere. If parents of any race meet
the necessary agency qualifications, then they should be allowed to
adopt the child of their choice. If they select a child of a different
race, they should be presumed able and willing to adequately address
all of her needs.165
This is not to say that an agency or judge cannot attempt to pre-
pare or educate parents before they adopt a different race child, as is
164. Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs., 465 A.2d 614, 628 (Pa. 1983). The
Davis court professed a hope that the importance of race in child placement would decrease
proportionately with the decrease of societal prejudice. Id. However, it could be argued that
such a hope is ironic in light of the court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of considering
race as a factor, as this decision may only perpetuate the very racial classifications and biases it
seeks to avoid.
Interestingly, the trial court in Davis found race to be an "extrajudicial consideration" and
therefore refused to consider it as a factor in the proceeding. Id. at 622. The appellate court
held that, indeed, race should have been considered, but that the trial court's failure to do so was
harmless, as all other factors compelled a finding against the white prospective parents. Id.
165. One father of a transracially adopted child, when asked whether he expected his daugh-
ter to seek out a same-race spouse in the future, noted, "Our children have been raised in a
home atmosphere where race has no bearing on relationships. I suspect she [a black nine-year-
old daughter] will feel free to seek out someone on the basis of personality, not race ......
SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 123, at 17.
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often done in the international sphere.1 66 Such preparation, if deemed
necessary, would not implicate any racial stigma or slur. It would sim-
ply impress upon the parents the gravity of their decision to undertake
a difficult but rewarding challenge.
It is probably most often the case that a white family who wants
to adopt an African-American child has liberal attitudes toward rela-
tionships between races, and is open to ideals of integration and social
change.167 As has been suggested elsewhere, "[i]ndividuals who are in
the vanguard of this social movement [toward acceptance of racial in-
tegration] ... should be encouraged, not deterred. ' '168 The interest of
these families is most likely to love, raise, and educate a child in a
happy, healthy environment. 169 To deny such families this right, and
to deny waiting children the right to these families merely on account
of race, is highly suspect from a constitutional perspective and unwise
from a perspective of social policy and child welfare.
The best interests of children are served by placing children with
stable, healthy families. One would expect that a healthy family envi-
ronment, regardless of race, will adequately prepare a child for life in
society as we know it. Indeed, it is believed that parental nurturing
plays a major role in preparing for and combatting the effects of a
difficult society.1 70 As one judge has aptly explained, "[I]n a multira-
cial society such as ours, racial prejudice and tension are inevitable. If
166. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 123, at 10. Experts have noted that many white
parents will adopt an African-American child because "of their own involvement in the civil
rights movement and as a reflection of their general sociopolitical views." Id. The notion of
people adopting different-race children as veritable trophies of their liberalism, however, is of
notable concern to some critics. With regard to children of foreign birth, one adoption worker
proclaimed, "You are adopting a child, not a tropical house-plant to put in the living room."
REPORT ON FOREIGN ADOPTION, supra note 134, at 19.
168. See Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and
Custody Proceedings, 17 BuFF. L. REV. 303, 333 (1968).
169. Although it is probably not the conscious purpose of adoptive parents, one consequence
of transracial adoption may be to open up "another window through which to view the world.
Simply put, [the transracial adoptees] help make the parents' lives more varied, more interesting,
and more challenging." SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 123, at 114.
170. See generally COMER & POUSSAINT, supra note 23. Interestingly, Comer & Poussaint
noted that although differences in culture will affect styles of child rearing, fundamental child
rearing practices are the same for all races:
[African-American] basic child-rearing practices should be the same as those of
others.... Good child-rearing principles are fundamentally the same for all, because
the basic needs of children are universal. Youngsters need food, clothing, shelter, and
protection from physical and psychological damage.... Modern life forces groups of
every kind to have the flexibility necessary to accept changes. As long as such changes
protect and provide for the best interest of our children, there is little reason for con-





.. children are raised in a happy and stable home, they will be able to
cope with prejudice and hopefully learn that people are unique indi-
viduals who should be judged as such. ' 171 The American family, in-
terracial or not, is an ideal arena in which to concentrate our
preliminary efforts to combat prejudice.172 Indeed, the inattention of
race-matching policies to parental nurturing provides a compelling in-
terest against their implementation.
The reality is that there are a disproportionate number of minor-
ity children without homes. A history of discrimination and a variety
of socio-economic phenomena are responsible for this. Thus, these
children are the responsibility of all Americans. Removing race from
a "best interest of the child" determination will speed up the adoption
process for children whose placement has been needlessly delayed,
and will fight against the tendency to always think in racial terms. It is
impossible to achieve integration and combat racism when public poli-
cies such as race-matching perpetuate separatism and the ancient pre-
mium placed on racial purity.
CONCLUSION
Though racially homogenous families may be optimal environ-
ments for children, advocating even a preference for race-matching is
both legally flawed and socially impractical. Racial classifications
have not been historically tolerated, yet, courts have upheld policies
that include race as a factor to be considered in child placement
proceedings.
While the governmental interest in insuring the welfare of chil-
dren is certainly compelling, consideration of race is neither necessary
nor narrowly tailored to advance this interest. Transracial placements
have proven to be successful. Moreover, the number of international
adoptions, which are nearly always interracial, is increasing. Further-
more, the unstructured rule that race may play a role in a placement
decision lends itself to abuse of discretion. From a constitutional per-
spective, then, race-conscious child placement is impermissible.
In addition, from a practical standpoint, race-matching will often
be at odds with the best interest of the child. Because there are too
few African-American families seeking to adopt, the immediate effect
171. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 1973) (quoting Judge Hoffman's dissent in
the lower court decision).
172. As one scholar noted, "using race as a factor ... is arguably stigmatizing in that it
represents the cumulative judgment that, in the most intimate association of all, family life, it is
best that the races should remain separate." Perry, supra note 119, at 78.
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of race-matching will be to deprive waiting children of permanent
homes.
In light of the legal and practical problems raised by race-match-
ing, even a mere preference for same-race placement should not be
advocated by states, adoption agencies, or the federal government.
Any explicit or implicit policy preferencing separation of the races
does nothing more than stamp approval on primitive notions of racial
purity and perpetuate racial prejudice.
